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THE PRIVATIZATION OF THE
AMERICAN FISHERY: LIMITATIONS,
RECOGNITIONS, AND THE PUBLIC TRUST
Douglas F Britton*
And God blessed them, and God said unto them,
Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it.
and have dominion over the fish of the sea .... 1
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.2
I. INTRODUCTION
In Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc.,3 the United States Supreme
Court seemingly laid to rest any lingering contentions of vested ownership
theory relating to fisheries resources, stating that "it is pure fantasy to talk
of 'owning' wild fish, birds, or animals. Neither the States nor the
Federal Government, any more than a hopeful fisherman or hunter, has
title to these creatures until they are reduced to capture."4 This doctrine,
that common resources such as fish are of an inherently wild nature, or
ferae naturae, such that actual possession is required in order to establish
individual ownership, has survived as an unwavering fixture of the
common law, and..has guided courts in their treatment of fishermen's
rights and interests in the living resource that they harvest. In near
defiance of this doctrine, some courts have gone so far as to suggest that
fishermen hold a "constructive property interest" in fisheries,5 but in spite
of such developments, the doctrine of ferae naturae has maintained its
vitality and persists as theoretical support to another common law doe-
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 1997.
1. Genesis 1:28.
2. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968).
3. 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
4. Id at 284.
5. Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975, 978 (E.D. Va. 1981).
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trine, that of res communes, under which fisheries resources are owned
in common, and which supports a common right to fish.6 However,
traditional definitions of "property" recognize that the essence of property
lies in the sum of fights and powers incident to ownership,7 with particular
emphasis on rights of use. This Comment utilizes a "sum of rights"
approach to discuss the modem proprietary relationship between fisher-
men and the fisheries that they depend upon. By analyzing this relation-
ship from the perspective of specific legal contexts, this Comment argues
that U.S. fishermen have acquired a sufficient quorum of property
interests to recognize that they may hold some legitimate form of private
property interest in fisheries resources,' and that this interest may be
recognized under the framework of the public trust doctrine in the
furtherance of fisheries management and conservation efforts.
This Comment begins its analysis in Part II, by outlining the common
law doctrines that have historically limited the ability of fishermen to
acquire proprietary interests in fisheries resources. Part III will then
analyze the proprietary interests that are held by fishermen in fisheries
resources, through the discussion of several specific legal contexts,
6. See Anthony D. Scott, Conceptual Origins of Rights Based Fishing, in RIGHTS BASED
FISHING 11, 15-17 (P. Neher et al. eds., 1988); J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in
the Civil and the Common Law, 3 FLA. ST. L. REv. 513, 522-23, 523 n.50 (1975) (noting
that res communes is also accepted to mean ownership by the state, which is commonly
refered to as res publicae); Seth Macinko, Public or Private?: United States Commercial
Fisheries Management and the Public Trust Doctrine, Reciprocal Challenges, 33 NAT. RES.
J. 919 (1993).
7. See, e.g., Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 268
(1933). See also RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 5 cmt. e (1936) (the "totality of interests"
constitutes complete property).
8. For the purposes of this Comment, the following statutory definitions of"fishery" and
"fishery resource" are adopted:
(13) The term "fishery" means-
(A) one or more stocks of fish which can be treated as a unit for purposes of
conservation and management and which are identified on the basis of geographical,
scientific, technical, recreational, and economic characteristics; and
(B) any fishing for such stocks.
(14) The term "fishery resource" means any fishery, any stock offish, any species of
fish, and any habitat offish.
16 U.S.C.A. § 1802(13)-(14) (West 1985 & Supp. 1997). Under these definitions, the
concept of a "fishery" resource includes the use of these resources by fishermen. Thus, in
the context of the discussion that follows, the focus of references to "private" or "propri-
etary" interests in fisheries resources lies in the right of fishermen to have access to the use
of these resources.
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including the ability of fishermen to recover for economic losses in tort.
Next, Part IV discusses the extent to which the Fifth Amendment has
provided constitutional protection for the proprietary interests of fisher-
men. Part V continues by outlining the various private interests that
fishermen have acquired through rights based fishery management
systems. Finally, Part VI discusses how proprietary interests in fisheries
may be recognized under the public trust doctrine in the furtherance of
fisheries management and conservation efforts.
The recognition and future utilization of proprietary interests in U.S.
fisheries management is a matter of particular importance in view of the
Sustainable Fisheries Act,9 enacted in October of 1996, which amended
the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act10 and which
also mandated a moratorium on the implementation and approval of any
fishery management plan that creates a new individual fishing quota
program." This legislation also calls for a comprehensive study and
report on the use of individual fishing quota programs, to be completed
by October 1, 1998.1 As the federal government pauses to reconsider
and evaluate the future use of such rights-based fishery management
programs, it is important to realize, as this Comment argues, that the
recognition of these proprietary rights is consistent with how the law has
traditionally recognized such private interests in a variety of contexts.
Moreover, the framework of the public trust doctrine, by providing for
the concurrent existence of public and private interests in common
resources, should to a large extent dispel the condemnation of rights-based
fishery management programs as an unqualified give-away of public
resources, and that this framework provides a foundation for recognizing
more stable, long-term proprietary interests in fisheries that may enhance
the overall effectiveness and conservation value of rights-based fishery
management strategies in the future.
II. DocTRINES, DEFINITIONS, RIGHTS, AND INTERESTS
The common law doctrines of ferae naturae and res communes have
historically imposed fundamental limitations on the existence of private
interests in common fisheries resources. Although these doctrines pre-
9. Pub. L. No. 104-297, 110 Stat. 3559 (1996).
10. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1883 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
11. Id § 1853(d)(1)(A).
12. Pub. L. No. 104-297, § 108(f), 110 Stat. at 3577 (1996).
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elude the recognition of absolute vested ownership in fisheries, other
forms of proprietary interests may be held by fishermen in these common
resources. By using a "summation of rights" approach to examine these
interests in a number of illustrative legal contexts, it is possible to evaluate
the extent to which U.S. fishermen have developed a proprietary interest
in fisheries resources.
A. An Overview of Common Law Doctrines
There are several common law doctrines that frame the boundaries of
the modem fisherman's proprietary relationship with fisheries resources. 3
The present status of the fisherman's proprietary interest in fisheries has
evolved from a common law context beginning in 1215 with the Magna
Carta, from which modem conceptions of a public right to fish have been
derived.' 4 Before the Magna Carta, the king could grant rights to inshore
tidal fisheries.' 5 At that time, all submerged lands were held by the
Crown, and these submerged lands could be granted to private individuals
who would also obtain exclusive rights to any overlying fisheries.' 6 In the
event that the submerged lands and the overlying fishery were too far
offshore to allow for exclusive ownership, the fishery was classified as res
nullius, meaning that the fishery belonged to no one in the sense of private
property under the common law, the rationale for which was premised
upon the impossibility of any nation's ability to protect or defend these
offshore fisheries.' 7
13. It is not the purpose of this Comment to supply a detailed historical analysis of the
common law doctrines that relate to property interests in fisheries resources; for a complete
treatment, see generally Scott, supra note 6. For a judicial account of such doctrines, see
generally Greer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896); Shively v. Bowlby 152 U.S. 1 (1893).
Although the public trust doctrine is intimately related to the discussion in this section, full
consideration of this doctrine is given infra, in Part VI of this Comment.
14. Scott, supra note 6, at 17-18. See also Martin v. Waddell 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367,
412 (1842) (discussing the effect of Magna Carta to prevent the king from granting rights
in free fisheries).
15. Scott, supra note 6, at 17.
16. Id.
17. MacGrady, supra note 6, at 523. See also Peter H. Pearse, From Open Access to
Private Property: Recent Innovations in Fishing Rights as Instruments of Fisheries Policy,
23 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 71, 72 (1992) (noting that Hugo Grotius argued in 1609 that
property could only exist if the holder was able to defend it against others).
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After the Magna Carta was signed in 1215, the Crown could no
longer grant exclusive rights to fisheries,"8 and since that time fisheries
have been res communes only, meaning that ownership is common, or
held by the public, and there has existed a public right to fish under the
common law.' 9 As the Supreme Court has stated, in reviewing the
common law in England in relation to the ownership of fisheries, "the
common people of England have regularly a liberty of fishing in the sea,
or creeks, or arms thereof, as a public common of piscary, and may not,
without injury of their right, be restrained of it." 0 Thus, fisheries on the
high seas remained res nullis, but fisheries within the territorial sea of a
given country were owned in common by the people of that country, who
enjoyed a common right to fish those resources.2" Individual ownership
of the actual fish was, and still is, limited by the doctrine offerae naturae,
under which common property resources, such as fish, are inherently wild
and remain res communes until a person reduces it to possession by
capture.' This doctrine has been widely utilized by the courts in the
United States and continues to serve as a basis for the limitation of private
property interests in U.S. fisheries.
B. Proprietary Interests in Relation to Property Theory
Individual ownership of actual fish, and the public ownership of
fisheries are both distinguishable from the public right to fish, which is
derived from the Magna Carta and English common law,' and which is
preserved under the public trust doctrine.24 The right to fish has inde-
pendent characteristics of property,' which are derived from the theory
18. Scott, supra note 6, at 17.
19. Pearse, supra note 17, at 72.
20. Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 412 (1842).
21. Id. See also GARY D. LIBECAP, CONTRACTING FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 76 (1989)
("Both common law as well as legislative and judicial actions, have emphasized the right of
all citizens for free access to fisheries and other wildlife.").
22. Greer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 526-27 (1896). See also Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416 (1920); Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. at 284; Pierson v. Post,
3 Cai. RL 175 (N.Y. 1805).
23. Martin v. Wadell, 41 U.S. at 412.
24. The public trust doctrine is discussed infra Part IV.
25. Macinko, supra note 6, at 923. But see Christopher L. Koch, A Constitutional
Analysis ofLimited Entry, in LIM=TED ENTRY AS A FISHERY MANAGEMENT TooL 251,265
(R Bruce Ritteg & Jay J. C. Ginter eds., 1978) ("A claim that there is a property right in the
right to fish is groundless as an abstract proposition.").
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of property as a collection of rights. 26 This rights-based approach to
property allows for a distinction to be drawn between "corporeal" and
"incorporeal" property The right to fish, as a species of property, may
be theoretically categorized as an incorporeal form of property, if it is
sufficiently supported by other incidents of ownership commonly referred
to as a "bundle of rights."' Among the more important rights which are
elements of the concept of property are exclusivity, durability, flexibility,
transferability, title, and divisibility.29 Most essential is the right of use,
which gives meaning to title and the diminution of which is a focus of
takings claims."0
Another relevant theory of private property is that the owner of
private property is that person who, in the case of destruction or damage
to that property, must sustain the loss of the property.3' This theory can
apply to either corporeal or incorporeal property, and serves as a func-
tional test for the existence of private property rights.
The perspective of private property rights as a sum of rights and
powers incident to ownership 2 serves as a useful "prism" through which
to analyze the present status of fishermen's proprietary interest in fisher-
ies. An examination of these rights can give insight into the extent to
which fishermen have developed a private interest in fisheries under
particular circumstances. Relevant subjects for this examination are: (1)
the ability of fishermen to recover for economic loss due to damage to
fisheries resources, including recovery under publicized private settle-
ments; (2) the ability of fishermen to recover in takings claims for the
physical or regulatory loss of fishing harvest; (3) the present status of
rights that fishermen have obtained through limited entry fishery manage-
ment systems; and, (4) the present status of the fisherman's right to fish
as protected under the public trust doctrine.
26. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 5 cmt. e (1936).
27. See Macinko, supra note 6, at 945.
28. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992);
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982); United States
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945).
29. Scott, supra note 6, at 14.
30. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. at 1030; Yee v. City of
Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992).
31. See Automobile Underwriters, Inc. v. Tite, 85 N.E.2d 365, 367 (Ind. 1949); T.W.
Sprinks Co. v. Pachound Bros., 92 S.W.2d 50, 54 (Ky. 1936).
32. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249, 268 (1933).
Privatization of the American Fishery
m. RECOVERY FOR ECONOMIC LOSS
One illustration of the existence of fishermen's proprietary interests
in fisheries is the ability of fishermen to recover for economic losses
arising from damage to fisheries resources, particularly in the context of
pollution related damages. Although traditional tort principles under the
maritime law have historically limited the ability of private parties to
recover for economic losses, an exception to these principles has devel-
oped to allow for fishermen to recover for economic losses arising from
pollution related damages to fisheries resources. Several rationales have
been offered for this exception, including the existence of a "constructive
property interest" held by fishermen in fisheries resources. Fishermen
also have an enhanced ability to recover for economic losses under federal
statutory mechanisms, and they have historically demonstrated an ability
to recover substantial monetary settlements from private entities in the
wake of significant oil spills and similar incidents that have damaged
natural resources. The overall ability of fishermen to recover for eco-
nomic losses sustained to fisheries resources is evidence of a special
relationship between fishermen and those resources, and this favored
ability represents one set'of distinguishing legal interests that fishermen
hold in fisheries resources.
A. Recovery for Economic Loss: Background Principles
Under maritime law, the general rule that governs an individual's
ability to recover for the negligent infliction of economic loss is set forth
under the seminal case of Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint.33 In
33. 275 U.S. 303 (1927). A complete analysis of the recovery of economic losses
under the maritime law is beyond the scope of this Comment; for a thorough discussion see
Karen Beth Clark, Recovery for Economic Losses Under the Massachusetts Oil and
Hazardous Material Release Prevention and Response Act: Chapter 21E, 21 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 511 (1994); Victor P. Goldberg, Recovery for Economic Loss Following the
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1994); Cameron H. Totten, Recovery for
Economic Loss Under Robins Dry Dock and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990: Sekco Energy,
Inc. v. M/V Margaret Chouest, 18 TUL. MAR. L. J. 167 (1993); Sturla Olsen, Recovery for
the Lost Use of Water Resources: M/V Testbank on the Rocks?, 67 TUL. L. REV. 271 (1992);
Bruce B. Weyhrauch, Oil Spill Litigation: Private Party Lawsuits andLimitations, 27 LAND
& WATER LAW REv. 363 (1992); Pegeen Mulhem, Marine Pollution, Fishers, and the
Pillars of the Land A Tort Recovery Standard for Pure Economic Losses, 18 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REv. 85 (1990); James W. Shephard, The Murky Waters of Robins Dry Dock- A
19971]
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Robins, a time charter sought recovery of economic losses which occurred
when the defendant dry dock company negligently damaged the propeller
of a chartered vessel that was suspended in dry dock, although the dry
dock company was not then aware of the charter held by the plaintiff.
The United States Supreme Court denied recovery on the grounds that:
The damage was material to ... [the charter] only as it caused
the delay in making the repairs, and that delay would be a wrong
to no one except for the petitioner's contract with the owners.
The injury to the propeller was no wrong to the respondents but
only to those to whom it belonged.34
The Court then went on to state that "no authority need be cited to show
that, as a general rule, at least, a tort to the person or property of one man
does not make the tortfeasor liable to another merely because the injured
person was under a contract" with the other person, without the knowl-
edge of the wrongdoer.35 The holding of Robins has been interpreted to
mean that in order for a plaintiff to recover for economic losses, the
plaintiff must hold a property interest in what is damaged, and that the
damage must be some form of actual physical damage.36
The rule of Robins has been consistently applied in cases of maritime
tort law.37 The rationale for the rule has often been explained in terms of
protecting defendants from the potentially enormous liability that may
arise in the context of economic loss38 (for example, as with oil spills),
Comparative Analysis of Economic Loss in Maritime Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 995 (1986);
Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss: A Reassessment,
37 STAN. L. REV. 1513 (1985).
34. Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. at 308.
35. Id. at 309.
36. See Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974); Louisiana ex rel. Guste
v. MN Testbank, 728 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1984), affd en banc, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir.
1985); In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Alaska 1991); L.O.F. (Jersey) Ltd. v.
M/T Cantigny, 1982 A.M.C. 2707 (E.D. La. 1982); Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F.
Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981); In re Oriental Republic Uruguay, 821 F. Supp. 950-(D. Del.
1993); Thomas W. Kinnane, Recovery for Economic Losses by the Commercial Fishing
Industry: Rules, Exceptions, and Rationales, 4 U. BALT. J. ENvTL. L. 86 (1994).
37. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Doxford & Sunderland, Ltd., 782 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir.
1986); Hercules Carriers, Inc. v. Florida, 720 F.2d 1201, 1202-03 (11 th Cir. 1983); Akron
Corp. v. MiT Cantigny, 706 F.2d 151, 153 (5th Cir. 1983); Getty Ref. & Mktg. Co. v. M/T
Fadi B, 766 F.2d 829, 831 (3d Cir. 1985).
38. Totten, supra note 33, at 169.
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and also in terms of promoting judicial efficiency through the deterrence
of unnecessary or fraudulent litigation.39 In operation, the rule has served
to limit private individuals' recovery under maritime law for economic
losses arising from negligent damage to natural resources, such as
fisheries. °
B. The Fisherman's Exception to Robins Dry Dock
The rule of Robins has not, however, been applied uniformly to all
claimants. An exception to the rule exists for commercial fishermen,
which has been allowed, at least in the Ninth Circuit, since its 1953
genesis in Carbone v. Ursich.4' In Carbone, the Ninth Circuit allowed
commercial fishermen to recover for economic losses arising from
negligent damage sustained to a certain fishing vessel and fishing gear,
where the claimant fishermen were not the owners of the damaged
property.42 Later, in Union Oil Co. v. Oppen,43 the Ninth Circuit reaf-
firmed the exception to Robins for commercial fishermen and allowed the
recovery of economic losses sustained by the fishermen as a result of a
1969 oil spill in Santa Barbara, California. The court carved out an
expansive rationale for recovery in recognizing that the fishermen's
recovery would be consistent not only with the maritime law, which
applied in the case, but that recovery could also be obtained under
California tort law,' including recovery under a nuisance theory.4'
The result in Oppen solidified the exception to the rule of Robins, and
has given rise to what is now termed the "Oppen Exception. "46 This
exception has since been applied to allow for the recovery of economic
losses sustained by commercial fishermen as a result of pollution or oil
39. Pegeen Mulhern, supra note 33, at 91.
40. See Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247 (D. Me. 1973) (not allowing
recovery by businesses for economic losses arising from oil spill).
41. 209 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1953).
42. Id at 179. Even before Carbone, some state courts had also allowed commercial
fishermen to recover, under a private nuisance theory, for economic losses arising from
damages to fisheries resources as a result of pollution related harms. See Masonite Corp.
v. Steede, 23 So.2d 756 (Miss. 1945); Hampton v. North Carolina Pulp Co., 27 S.E.2d 538
(N.C. 1943).
43. 501 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1974).
44. Id. at 565.
45. Id at 568.
46. Kinnane, supra note 36, at 99.
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spill related damages to fisheries resources.47 Such recovery has been
allowed even though fishermen theoretically do not possess a private
property interest in the fisheries resources that sustained damage.
C. Rationales for the "Oppen Exception"
The rationale for the fishermen's exception, or "Oppen Exception" in
admiralty has been attributed to several theories. First, and perhaps most
prevalently, the special treatment of commercial fishermen has been based
upon the principle of forseeability. As the court in Oppen stated:
[The presence of a duty on the part of the defendants in this case
* . . turn[s] substantially on forseeability. That being the crucial
determinant, the question must be asked whether the defendants
could reasonably have foreseen that negligently conducted drilling
operations might diminish aquatic life and thus injure the business
of commercial fishermen. We believe the answer is yes. The
dangers of pollution were and are known even by school children.
The defendants understood the risks of their business and should
have reasonably foreseen the scope of its responsibilities.48
This explanation gives rise to a duty of care which is owed to commercial
fishermen by defendants who are in a position to damage fisheries
resources through environmental pollution.49
A second rationale for the fishermen's exception is public policy,
which demands that those who are responsible for the negligent or
criminal damage to a marine ecosystem should be liable, to some extent,
as a means of deterrence.50 A third rationale is rooted in the law of
47. See Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Va. 1981) (allowing
commercial fishermen to recover for economic damages arising from chemical spill in James
River); In re Exxon Valdez, 767 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Alaska 1991) (allowing commercial
fishermen to recover for damages to fisheries resources in wake of Exxon Valdez oil spill);
Burgess v. MIV Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 250 (D. Me. 1973) (recovery for economic
losses allowed for commercial fishermen in wake of oil spill); Louisiana ex rel. Guste v.
MN Testbank, 524 F. Supp. 1170, 1173-74 (E.D. La. 1981) (commercial fishermen,
shrimpers, and oyster farmers allowed to recover economic losses arising from ship collision
resulting in oil spill).
48. Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d at 569.
49. Id.
50. Id. See also Andrew W. McThenia & Joseph E. Ulrich, A Return to Principles of
Corrective Justice in Deciding Economic Loss Cases, 69 VA. L. REV. 1517, 1526 (1983)
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admiralty. As one court has explained, "claims for economic loss asserted
by the commercial oystermen, shrimpers, crabbers and fishermen raise
unique considerations requiring separate attention. Traditionally, seamen
have been recognized as favored in admiralty and their economic interests
require the fullest possible legal protection.""' However, the most
controversial explanation, and the most relevant for the present discus-
sion, is the recognition of a "constructive ownership" interest that fisher-
men hold in fisheries, which allows them to circumvent the obstacle of
Robins, which requires a property interest in that which is damaged in
order to allow for economic recovery.5 2
The recognition of a "constructive ownership" interest held by
fishermen in fisheries resources has not been widely accepted, 3 nor has
the idea of fishermen holding some form of private right to fish, 4 which
is undoubtedly a result of the modem legal paradigm that regards fisheries
resources as res communes. However, the theory is appealing because it
recognizes the special relationship that exists between fishermen and the
marine life they harvest. This relationship essentially places fishermen in
a guardianship role over fisheries, because their economic relationship
with this resource can determine whether a given fishery population exists
at a sustainable level, or whether the fishery is depleted as a consequence
of overfishing and the now proverbial "tragedy of the commons." 5 In
view of this intimate relationship, the "constructive ownership" rationale
(discussing deterrence rationale).
51. Louisiana ex rel. Guste v. MIV Testbank, 524 F. Supp. at 1173 (citing Carbone v.
Ursich, 209 F.2d at 182); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d at 567; see also Kinnane, supra
note 36, at 93-94 (discussing fishermen and seamen as the "favorites of admiralty" under
rationale of the "Oppen Exception").
52. Pruitt v. Allied Chem. Corp., 523 F. Supp. at 978.
53. Douglas v. Seacoast Products, 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977) (discussing doctrine of
ferae naturae); Le Clair v. Swift 76 F. Supp. 729, 733 (E.D. Wis. 1948) (commercial
fishermen do not have absolute right to fish and do not possess private property interest in
fish within state waters, which belong to state until reduced to possession); Burgess v. M/V
Tamano, 370 F. Supp. at 250 ("[TMhe fishermen and clam diggers have no individual
property rights with respect to the waters and marine life allegedly damaged by the oil
spill."); Gregg L. Spyridon and Sam A. LeBlanc, III, The Overriding Public Interest in
Privately Owned Natural Resources: Fashioning a Cause ofAction, 6 TUL. ENVTL. L. J.
287, 295 (1993) (fishermen have no private property interest in marine life).
54. See, e.g., Burgess v. MV Tamano, 370 F. Supp. at 249-50 ("[iT]he right to fish or
harvest clams in Maine's coastal waters is not the private right of any individual.").
55. Hardin, supra note 2, at 1243.
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for the "Oppen Exception" is an insightful reflection of the increasingly
"finite" nature of fisheries resources.
The "constructive ownership" theory does not displace the common
law doctrines that have established fisheries resources as common
property subject to the common right to fish held by the public. How-
ever, in spite of such proprietary limitations, this explanation for the
fishermen's ability to recover for economic losses, and the very existence
of the "Oppen Exception" as an operational doctrine of the law of admi-
ralty, suggests that there has been a growing recognition of legitimate
interest that fishermen have in fisheries resources. In situations where
fisheries are damaged by oil spills or other environmental pollution, it is
indeed the fisherman who most clearly "must sustain the lOSS"5 6 of the
resource. In this sense, the fishermen holds at least one small piece of a
"bundle of rights" in fisheries resources which is not uniformly held by
others under the maritime law.
D. Statutory Recovery for Economic Loss by Fishermen
Under the Oil Pollution Act
The Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA),57 enacted by Congress in the
wake of the catastrophic Exxon Valdez oil spill, has dramatically altered
the landscape of tort recovery for economic loss arising from oil spill
damage to natural resources, including fisheries resources.58 The OPA
was enacted to provide a comprehensive statutory framework for recovery
that replaces the inadequate statutory framework that existed prior to the
OPA.59 Under the OPA, fishermen and non-fishermen can both recover
as private claimants for economic damages arising from oil spill damages
to natural resources. As stated in § 2702(a), "each responsible party for
a vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged ... into or upon the
56. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
57. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (1994).
58. While this section gives a brief overview of the OPA in the context of fishermen's
recovery of economic losses, a complete discussion of the OPA, and state oil pollution
recovery statutes enacted subsequent to the OPA, is beyond the scope of this Comment For
a comprehensive treatment, see Goldberg, supra note 33; Mulhern, supra note 33; Mark E.
King, Note, In Re Complaint of.Armatur, S.A.: The Limitation of Liability Act and Maritime
Environmental Disasters, 21 ENvTL. L. 405, 412-16 (1991); Weyhrauch, supra note 33;
Antonio J. Rodriguez & Paul A.C. Jaffe, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 15 TUL. MAR. L.J.
1(1990).
59. See Rodriguez & Jaffe, supra note 58, at 1.
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navigable waters and adjoining shorelines . .. is liable for the removal
costs and damages... that result from such incident."' More specifi-
cally, the OPA allows claimants to recover damages for "injury to, or
economic losses resulting from destruction of, real or personal property,
which shall be recoverable by a claimant who owns or leases that prop-
erty."61 Additionally, and most important to the present discussion, the
OPA provides for recovery of damages "for loss of subsistence use of
natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant who so uses
natural resources which have been injured, destroyed, or lost, without
regard to the ownership or management of the resources."62 This provi-
sion circumvents the limitations of the recovery rule of Robins by allow-
ing private parties to recover for economic losses in the absence of any
proprietary interest in the natural resource which is damaged.
A Conference Committee Report elaborated on the ability of a
claimant to recover under the OPA without actually having a property
interest in the natural resource:
[A]ny claimant may recover for loss of profits or impairment of
earning capacity resulting from injury to property or natural
resources. The claimant need not be owner of the damaged
property or resources to recover for lost profits or income. For
example, a fisherman may recover lost income due to damaged
fisheries resources, even though the fisherman does not own those
resources.
63
Thus, the legislative history of the OPA does not recognize an ownership
interest, or "constructive ownership" interest, in its explanation of
allowing for the recovery of economic losses. However, the Conference
Report does indicate that commercial fishermen are the most likely
candidates for the recovery of such losses. The extent to which non-
60. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1994). The term "liable has been used by Congress as
meaning strict and joint and several liability. See Rodriguez & Jaffe, supra note 58, at 15-
16.
61. 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(B) (1994).
62. Id. § 2702(b)(2)(C) (emphasis added). Section 2702(b)(2)(E) specifies that
recovery is allowed for damages that are "equal to the loss of profits of impairment of
earning capacity due to the injury, destruction, or loss of real property, personal property,
or natural resources, which shall be recoverable by any claimant." Id § 2702(b)(2)(E).
63. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101- 653, at 103 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N 779,
781 (emphasis added).
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fishermen private claimants will be able to recover under the OPA
remains to be determined.' However, despite the clear non-ownership
language stated above, it remains apparent that recovery of such economic
losses will still involve a requirement of proximity under traditional
causation principles of tort law,65 and there is no claimant who is better
positioned to recover for proximate injury than the fisherman who
depends upon the healthy condition of the fish to make a living. Although
the significance of the "Oppen Exception" has been diminished by the
emergence of the economic recovery provisions of the OPA, under which
recovery is not fully preempted by the Robins rule under maritime law,'
the special relationship which fishermen have with fisheries resources is
still manifested in their favored ability to recover for proximate damages.
E. Recovery for Losses Under Private Settlements
Another prism through which to view the interests of fishermen in
fisheries is that of private oil spill liability settlements. Settlements, of
course, are not direct evidence of property rights, but they are instructive
to the extent that they evince some form of recognition, by private parties,
of the fisherman's special relationship with fisheries resources. When a
private party arrives at a settlement involving the claims of fishermen for
oil spill related damages, the settlement indicates, among other things, that
the claimant fishermen is in some respect entitled to compensation for the
damage inflicted upon a given fishery. As described below, the examples
of such settlements are numerous.
The best-known oil spill in U.S. history occurred when the Exxon
Valdez ran aground in Alaska's Prince William Sound, on March 24,
1989, spilling approximately eleven million gallons of heavy crude oil into
the previously pristine waters. 67 After the barrage of litigation was
64. Olsen, supra note 33, at 287.
65. See Benefiel v. Exxon Corp., 959 F.2d 805 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that gasoline
purchasers in California could not recover for economic losses due to increased gas prices
following the Exxon Valdez oil spill, despite strict liability scheme that applied under the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act); Olsen, supra note 33, at 287.
66. The OPA is not preempted by the maritime law to the extent that claimants may
recover economic damages up to the statutory limits provided. For a discussion of the
relationship between the maritime law and recovery under the OPA, and subsequently
enacted state oil pollution liability statutes, see Olsen, supra note 33, at 289-91; Weyhrauch,
supra note 33, at 392-401.
67. Dave Lenckus, Exxon Seeks More Spill Cover; Oil Giant Reaches Partial
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finished, Exxon had paid out approximately $3.8 billion dollars total,
including $2.5 billion in clean-up costs, $1 billion to settle state and
federal civil charges, and $300 million to settle claims that were filed by
some 12,000 fishermen and other claimants.68 As a part of that historic
series of settlements, Exxon paid $20 million to compensate Native
Alaskans for the fish, seals, and other subsistence resources that were
destroyed by the spill.69 In another twist to Exxon's settlement history,
the oil giant unsuccessfully attempted to reach a $70 million settlement
with Seattle fish processors,7" which was later vitiated by a U.S. district
court judge. In keeping with the Robins rule, recreational fishermen were
not allowed to recover damages from Exxon.7 The settlements reached
in the wake of the Valdez disaster illustrate the advantaged position that
commercial fishermen and Native subsistence fishermen enjoy in the
context of pursuing claims for oil spill damages to fisheries resources.
In a series of related settlements, the Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.
reached a $98 million settlement with thousands of Alaska Natives,
fishermen, and other claimants, following the Exxon Valdez oil spill.' In
the settlement, $37.3 million was paid out specifically to Alaska fisher-
men, Natives, seafood processors, and aquaculture associations to
compensate for Alyeska's role in the historic Valdez oil spill.7'
In a more recent oil spill, the barge North Cape spilled oil into Rhode
Island waters on January 19, 1996. In the wake of this oil spill, many
lobstermen who were unable to work as a result of the spill, have accepted
partial settlements with the owners of the barge, Eklof Marine.74
Settlement with Insurers, Bus. INs., Jan. 22, 1996, at 1, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Papers File.
68. Id
69. Alaska Natives to Get $20 Million for Exxon Valdez Spill, Liability Week, Nov. 21,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Newsletters File; Exxon Settles Suit by Alaska
Natives for $20 Million in Valdez Settlement, ENERGY REP., Aug. 1, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, NWLTRS File.
70. Alaska: Judge Assails Secret Exxon Valdez Settlement, LIABILrIY WEEK, June 17,
1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, NWLTRS File.
71. Fishermen Lose Suit Over Valdez Spill, UPI, Aug. 23, 1994, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Wires File.
72. Panel Says Alyeska Can't Recover Spill Costs from Pipeline Tariffs, ANCHORAGE
DAILYNEWS, Apr. 3, 1996 at lB, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File.
73. Valdez Spill Payment OK'd; 1989 Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, Payment of Damages,
OIL DAILY, Dec. 1, 1994, at 5, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File.
74. Tom Mooney, Fishermen Wary ofSettlement; But an Adjuster Says that Accepting
Partial Payments Now Won't Jeopardize the Seamen's Future Claims Involving the North
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In two different settlements involving Native Americans, money was
paid to Indian tribes for costs involved with the restoration of fisheries
resources that were damaged by oil spills. In 1994, the Owners of the
Japanese fishing vessel Tenyo Maru and the Chinese bulk carrier Tou Hai
reached a $52,000 settlement with the Makah Indian tribe following a
1991 oil spill when the two vessels collided in Canadian waters, spilling
120,000 gallons of intermediate fuel and 53,000 gallons of diesel fuel.75
In another settlement in Canada, the Nuu-chah-nuith Tribal Council
reached a settlement with Sause Bros. Ocean Towing, as part of a greater
$8.7 million settlement that was reached with the U.S. and Canadian
governments, after a December 1988 oil spill that occurred when the tug
Ocean Service collided with, and punctured its barge, the Nestucca.76 The
agreement compensated for the damage to commercial and native fisher-
ies, and for other environmental damages.' Although the settlement was
not reached for damages to fisheries exclusively, they do demonstrate a
recognition of the special damages that occur when commercial and native
fisheries are disrupted by oil spills.
In 1992, another settlement arose from the July 30, 1984, oil spill that
occurred when the oil tanker Alvenus ruptured off of the coast of Louisi-
ana.78 The spill affected over forty miles of coastline, causing extensive
damage to coastline property. As part of a $6.3 million settlement with
the owners of the Alvenus, commercial shrimpers were specifically
compensated for diminished catches that followed the disaster.79
In the wake of the 1987 Glacier Bay oil spill, approximately 700
commercial fishermen reached settlements for a total of about $28
million.' In yet another U.S. oil spill settlement, the Greek owners of the
World Prodigy tanker, which in 1989 spilled 289,000 gallons of oil into
Cape Oil Spill, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL., Mar. 6, 1996, at 1B, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Papers File.
75. Owners ofTenyo Maru and Tuo Hai Agree to Pay $9 Million to Settle Claims from
1991 Oil Spill, OIL SPILL INTELLIGENCE REP., Oct. 20, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, NWLTRS File.
76. Settlement Reached on Environmental Damage from Nestucca Oil Spill, Canada
Newswire, June 1, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.
77. Id.
78. Islanders Pocket Cash from Oil Spill, HOUSTON Bus. J., Jan. 27, 1992, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File.
79. Id.
80. Mark Cursi, Oil Spill Bonanza Forces Association to Restructure, RECORDER, Mar.
22, 1991, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File.
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Narragansett Bay, reached a $550,000 agreement in 1991 with 465
fishermen for their lost earnings that resulted from the spill.8 '
A total settlement of $115 million dollars was finally reached in 1989
between Amoco and several French claimants, including the French
Government, French fishermen, shellfish farmers, and other parties, for
the catastrophic 1978 oil spill that occurred when the Amoco Cadiz
supertanker broke up off of the coast in northern France,' spilling over
sixty-eight million gallons of oil.' In another foreign oil spill, Sedco Inc.
reached an agreement with fishermen, as part of a $2.14 million settle-
ment with other claimants, following the gigantic Ixtoc I well blowout that
occurred in the Bay of Campeche in Mexico, on June 3, 1979. 4 As a
final example,' Texaco reached a $100,000 settlement in 1975 with
thirty-three clam diggers following the July, 1972, oil spill in Maine that
occurred when the Norwegian tanker Tamano struck a submerged ledge
in Casco Bay. 6
81. Tankers Owners PayforlJL Spill, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 18, 1991, Metro/ Region,
at 19, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File.
82. Deborah Hargreaves, Amoco Told to Pay More for Oil Spill, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 22,
1989, Section I, at 2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File.
83. Damages Set in Amoco Oil Spill, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1988, Part 1, at 1, available
in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File.
84. Sedco Settles Gulf Spill Suits, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEws DIGEST, Apr. 8, 1983,
A2, at 244, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File.
85. Although this Comment focuses on oil spill settlements that have been reached with
private commercial and native fishermen, there have also been numerous settlements that
have been paid to U.S. and state governments in order to compensate, among other things,
for damages to fisheries resources. See, e.g., Oil Spill Settlement, City News Service, Aug.
6, 1996, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File (following spill of 400,000 gallons
of crude oil when tanker American Trader grounded off California coast, three owners of
the tanker have settled with state governmental entities for a total of $10.9 million); Chevron
Agrees to Pay $500,000 in Settlement for El Segundo Spill, OIL DAILY, May 21, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File (Chevron reaches $500,000 settlement with
California agencies for March 16, 1991 oil spill of 20,000 gallons); $1.7 Million Settlement,
HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 12, 1994, Section A, at 40, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Papers File ($1.7 million settlement reached between Texas government and owners of
vessels involved in July 28, 1990 collision that resulted in 700,000 gallon spill); Shell
Agrees to $19.75 Million Accord, FACTS ON FILE WORLD NEWS DIGEsT, Dec. 8, 1989, at
908 El, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File (Shell settles for $19.75 million with
State of California for 500,000 gallon oil spill from an oil refinery in San Francisco Bay in
April 1988).
86. Information Bank Abstracts, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1975, at 22, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Papers File.
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This list of oil spill settlements demonstrates that the claims of
commercial and native fishermen carry significant weight when the
fisheries that they harvest are damaged by oil spills. Thus, the settlement
agreements represent another prism through which can be seen a recogni-
tion by private parties of the intimate and unique relationship between
fishermen and fisheries resources. In this sense, the agreements are
evidence of additional interests which are held by fishermen in marine
resources.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS TO FISHERMEN'S INTERESTS
Under the Fifth Amendment, the proprietary interests of fishermen
have traditionally received limited constitutional protection in the context
of takings and due process claims that arise from their use of fisheries
resources. However, there have been several circumstances in which
fishermen have been successful in bringing such claims, which indicates
that fishermen do enjoy some measure of constitutional protection of their
proprietary interests in fisheries. This protection provides additional
evidence of the existence of special proprietary interests held by fishermen
in fisheries resources.
A. Proprietary Limitations Evidenced Under the Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that:
"No person shall.., be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation. '87  The extent to which fishermen's interests in
fisheries resources are protected under this clause is the subject of this
section.8 8 By using the Takings Clause, and to a lesser extent, the Due
Process Clause, as a prism through which to view the development of
constitutional protections given to fishermen's interests, it can be seen that
fishermen do have some protected interests under the constitution which
are unique to their relationship with fisheries resources.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
88. For a complete discussion of the Takings Clause and the Fifth Amendment, see
generally Leslie Bender, The Takings Clause: Principles or Politics?, 34 BuFF. L. REv. 735
(1985); Joseph Sax, Takings, Private Property andPublic Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971);
Joseph Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
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Historically speaking, fishermen have not been successful in their
pursuit of takings claims for the compensation of restricted fishing rights
or lost fisheries resources,' mostly due to the historical treatment of fish,
and the doctrine of res communes.' Fishermen have consistently been
denied compensation for their takings claims, 9' which have usually been
brought against a government entity for an alleged regulatory taking.
Courts have reasoned that the common law prevents fishermen from
establishing a private, compensable interest in either fisheries, or in the
right to fish, even if those interests are protected by fishing licenses. As
one court has firmly stated: "[The] plaintiff does not have property in its
fishing licenses that requires protection pursuant to the takings clause of
the fifth amendment or the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. "2
As intimated by the quote above, the definition and recognition of
"property" for purposes of the Fifth Amendmene3 is central to the claims
of fishermen under the Takings Clause, and also under the Due Process
Clause. Whether fishermen bring claims under the Due Process Clause,
the Takings Clause, or whether they request injunctive relief, which
necessitates a constitutionally protected property interest,' the inability of
89. One commentator has stated that: "There is no historical or logical basis for arguing
that a fisherman has a constitutionally cognizable property right in the fish inhabiting the
fishery conservation zone or state waters. Similarly, a claim that there is a property right in
the right to fish is groundless as an abstract proposition." Koch, supra note 25, at 265.
90. See Douglas v. Seacoast Products, 431 U.S. 265 (1977).
91. There are numerous cases that demonstrate the inability of fishermen to recover for
a takings claim under the Fifth Amendment: see, e.g., Bums Harbor Fish Co., Inc. v.
Ralston, 800 F. Supp. 722 (S.D. Ind. 1992) (gill net ban did not constitute unconstitutional
taking of fishermen's property interests); Organized Fishermen of Fla. v. Watt, 590 F. Supp.
805 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (regulations restricting fishing in everglades did not constitute
unconstitutional taking of licensed fishermen's property); Bigelow v. Michigan Dep't of
Natural Resources, 727 F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Mich. 1989), vacated, 970 F.2d 154 (6th Cir.
1992) (rejecting takings claim of commercial fishermen, later vacated by Sixth Circuit for
lack of ripeness of claims).
92. Bums Harbor Fish Co., Inc. v. Ralston, 800 F. Supp. at 726.
93. See Bender, supra note 88, at 746 n.25. For a general discussion of the concept of
property, see BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONST'UTION (1977);
John A. Humbauch, A Unifying Theory for the Just Compensation Cases: Takings,
Regulation andPublic Use, 34 RUTGERs L. REV. 243 (1982). For an instructive analysis of
various property interests created under federal and state statutes in public lands, see Jan G.
Laitos & Richard A. Westfall, Government Interference with Private Interests in Public
Resources, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1987).
94. Ridenour v. Furness, 504 N.E.2d 336, 339 (Ind. App. 1987). "Property interests"
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fishermen to establish a private property interest has almost uniformly lead
to a denial of relief.95 The limitations that presently exist in relation to
fishermen's interests in fisheries was summarized by the court in LaBauve
v. Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries Commission, which explained that
"fish which are at large in state waters are the property of the state, as
public or common things," that "an individual has no proprietary interest
in the fish he is prevented from catching," and that "an individual has no
proprietary right to fish commercially in state waters. 96  Essentially,
fishermen have been regarded under these circumstances as possessing no
compensable, or prosecutable, property interests for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment, which is a natural consequence of the history of the common
property resources as established in history and under the common law.
B. Recognition of Proprietary Interests Under the Fifth Amendment
In spite of overwhelming precedence and commentary which dictates
that fishermen hold no proprietary interests in fisheries, or in the right to
fish, there have yet been several exceptions where courts have protected
these controversial interests. These recognitions, as described below, give
for purposes of the Takings Clause and the Due Process clause are not coextensive. Bums
Harbor Fish Co., Inc. v. Ralston, 800 F. Supp. at 726. See also Reed v. Village of
Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 948 (7th Cir. 1983) (merely because licenses do not have "some
of the conventional attributes of property... does not mean they are not property in a due
process clause sense").
95. See supra note 91. See also California Gillnetters Ass'n v. Department of Fish &
Game, 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (no fundamental right to fish as to support
claim that gillnet ban violated substantive due process); New York State Trawlers Ass'n v.
Jorling, 16 F.3d 1303 (2nd Cir. 1994) (scope and existence of trawler's permit to take
lobsters were not guaranteed by due process clause, such that amendments to N.Y.
conservation law to prohibit trawlers from taking, landing, or possessing lobsters did not
deprive trawlers of property interest under due process clause); Le Clair v. Natural
Resources Bd., 483 N.W.2d 278 (Wis. App. 1992) (fishermen held no constitutionally
protested property interest to indefinite continuation of fish quotas and time and area
restrictions sufficient to support due process claim); Ridenour v. Furness, 504 N.E.2d 336
(Ind. App. 1987) (fishermen had no property interest in fish harvested from Indiana waters
of Lake Michigan as to be entitled to preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of
temporary gillnet ban); LaBauve v. Louisiana Wildlife & Fisheries Comm'n, 444 F. Supp.
1370 (E.D. La. 1978) (Louisiana fishermen held no private property right in fish, which
belonged to the state, nor did they have private right to fish as to support request for
injunctive relief against fisheries regulations under due process).
96. LaBauve v. Louisiana Wildlife & Fisheries Comm'n, 444 F. Supp. at 1378.
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further evidence of the plausibility of fishermen holding some measure of
private proprietary interests in their relationship with fisheries resources.
In one rare exception to the generally unsuccessful nature of fisher-
men's takings claims, the United States Court of Claims held in 1952 that
where a deceased fishing licensee obtained a commercial fishing license
from the State of Maryland, which could be sold, devised, or passed onto
his estate, and where the licensee was prevented from fishing by actions
of the federal government, the licensee's right to fish was a property right
and the action of the government constituted a taking.' The plaintiff had
been a commercial pound net fisherman in Chesapeake Bay, and when the
Secretary of War reestablished the boundaries of a particular proving
grounds, the plaintiff was displaced from the area, which he held a license
to fish.9" The court stated that "the plaintiff had a sort of property right
in his fishing ground, and... the [g]overnment took that property from
him."99 This decision is unusual,"° because licenses and permits are not
generally viewed as property for eminent domain purposes. Furthermore,
they are considered to convey only a privilege, not a right, and the license
or permit is considered revocable at the discretion of the issuing govern-
mental authority."°'
However, fishing licenses and permits have been found in certain
circumstances to constitute protectable property rights for purposes of the
97. Jackson v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 1019 (Ct. Cl. 1952).
98. d at 1020.
99. d 
100. There are, however, other situations in which a licensed fisherman may succeed in
a takings claim; as one court has noted, "[a] license may very well be considered property
in relation to a third party." Bums Harbor Fish Co., Inc. v. Ralston, 800 F. Supp. 725, 728
(S.D. Ind. 1992).
101. See, e.g., Organized Fishermen of Fla. v. Watt, 590 F. Supp. 805, 815 (S. D. Fla.
1984) (fishing permit is a revocable privilege that does not support takings claim); Acton
v. United States, 401 F.2d 896, 899 (9th Cir. 1968) ("[A] license does not constitute property
for which the [g]overnment is liable upon condemnation.. . ."); Marine One, Inc. v.
Manatee County, 898 F.2d 1490, 1492-93 (1 Ith Cir. 1990) ([P]ermits to perform activities
on public land. . . are mere licenses whose revocation cannot rise to the level of a Fifth
Amendment taking."); Connerty v. Metropolitan Dist. Comm'n, 495 N.E.2d 840 (Mass.
1986) (license held by master clamdigger did not create property right that would permit him
to recover from Commission for discharge of raw sewage into harbor). See also Koch,
supra note 25, at 265 (discussing ephemeral characteristics of a license). But see Haavik v.
Alaska Packers' Ass'n, 263 U.S. 510 (1924); Anderson v. Smith, 71 F.2d 493 (9th Cir.
1934) (property right does exist in "right to fish" when right is expressly provided for in
statute).
19971
238 OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 3:217
Due Process Clause. " Under the Due Process Clause the proper inquiry
requires an application of federal constitutional principles, which dictate
a "functional" analysis of state law, to determine whether that law creates
a "legitimate claim of entitlement" for a fisherman in any given license." 3
After reviewing the state statutes in Indiana that provided for fishing
licenses, the court in Burns Harbor Fishing Co., Inc. v. Ralston concluded
that:
[The] plaintiff has a protectable property interest in its fishing
licenses. Plaintiff pays for the right to fish the Indiana waters of
Lake Michigan. The right to fish commercially is limited and has
value. Moreover, the Indiana licensing statute creates specific
rules for when a license may be revoked. . . . Thus, for the
duration of its licenses, Burns Harbor had a legitimate claim of
entitlement to fish in accordance with the terms of those
licenses. "0
This language adds an additional "right" or entitlement that further
supports the argument that fishermen hold a sufficient "bundle" of rights
as to enable the recognition of some measure of a fisherman's proprietary
interest in fisheries. However, it must also be noted that the due process
protection that is afforded to fishing licenses is not normally reasoned
upon an actual property interest, but rather is defined as a right of use
which arises from the consent of the person or authority that holds the
interest affected by the license. 105 Additionally, it must also be noted that
such "proprietary" interests, created by licenses, are approached by courts
in a fashion similar to that given to claims involving economic interests,
102. See Bums Harbor Fish Co., Inc. v. Ralston, 800 F. Supp. at 730 (citing Barry v.
Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979) (horse trainer's license); Bell v. Burson 402 U.S. 535, 539
(1971) (driver's license); Easter House v. Felder, 910 F.2d 1387, 1395 (7th Cir. 1990) (child
welfare agency license); LeBauve v. Louisiana Wildlife & Fisheries Comm'n, 444 F. Supp.
at 1378-79 (fishing license)).
103. Id. at 729 (quoting Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 948 (7th Cir.
1983)). See also Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (in order to have a
property interest in a government provided benefit, e.g., a fishing license, a person "must
have more than an abstract need" and must have a "legitimate claim of entitlement").
104. Bums Harbor Fish Co., Inc. v. Ralston, 800 F. Supp at 729-30. See also LeBauve
v. Louisiana Wildlife & Fisheries Comm'n, 444 F. Supp. at 1378-79 (fishermen's interests
in fishing license constitute "legitimate claims of entitlement").
105. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 512 (1936).
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or "the right to livelihood, " "°e which as a rule will invoke the least
demanding standards of review regarding substantive and procedural due
process protections. '0
An example of what is perhaps a more obvious and accepted recogni-
tion of fishermen's proprietary interests in fisheries is where a fishermen,
most usually an oyster fishermen, holds a leasehold interest in a fishery. 10
Leasehold interests"4 9 are a form of personal property that convey to the
lessor possessory interests" ° which are compensable for purposes of the
Takings Clause."' Courts have regularly acknowledged the compensable
nature of leaseholds,"' both inside and outside of the context of fisheries
related leaseholds."' As one court found: "Manifestly it seems that,
subject to the Government's dominant power over navigation, a lease of
oyster grounds, pursuant to state law ... constitutes 'private property'
106. For a thorough discussion of the "right to livelihood" and its historical treatment
under the due process analysis, see generally Wayne McCormack, Economic Substantive
Due Process and the Right ofLivelihood, 82 KY. L.L 397 (1993-94). See also Koch, supra
note 25, at 254-59 (discussing substantive and procedural due process in relation to limited
entry fishery management regimes).
107. See, e.g., California Gillnetters Ass'n v. Department of Fish and Game, 46 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 338, 344 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) ("[C]ourts have repeatedly cautioned that while a
particular right such as the right to work may have sufficient gravity to warrant heightened
judicial scrutiny of administrative rulings affecting that right, that status does not elevate the
right to one that is 'fundamental' for purposes of strictly scrutinizing legislative enactments"
that regulate the right.)
108. Although this section discusses lease interests in relation to takings and due process
claims, further discussion is offered, infra Part VI, on the topic of proposed leasehold
interests as an improved means of limited entry or rights based fishery management.
109. See generally 1-3 MILTON R. FREEDMAN, FRIEDMAN ON LEASES (3d. ed. 1990 &
1994 Cum. Supp.)
110. Id § 1.1.
111. Id § 1.1.
112. See, e.g., Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S.
470 (1973) (just compensation due to lessee not only for lost use, but also for loss of total
expected useful life of improvements made to underlying fee property); United States v.
Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946) (compensation awarded for government's
condemning of buildings occupied by lessor Petty Motor Company); 767 Third Avenue
Assocs. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1575, 1578 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (individual's right to
income under lease constitutes property under the Fifth Amendment).
113. See Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82, 87 (1913)
(owner or lessee of submerged lands has property right to uses of such lands that are not
obstructions to the overriding public interest in navigation); Blake v. United States, 181 F.
Supp. 584 (E.D. Va. 1960) (oyster leasehold constitutes private property, though plaintiff
was not entitled to compensation for alleged taking of oyster ground markers).
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in the lessee.""1 4 This recognition of compensable interests is not unique
to fishermen, because the compensability of leasehold property interests
is a consequence of the nature of the lease interest, rather than a result of
the occupational characteristics of the lease holder. However, the
existence and compensability of such leases in the context of fisheries
resources at least represents an additional element to the range of potential
protectable interests that may be held by fishermen.
Finally, in one last anomalous example of protectable or compensable
interests held by fishermen, the United States Court of Claims found in
1961 that certain fishermen in Chesapeake Bay had an equitable right to
be compensated for the value of their fishing rights that were taken as a
result of a restriction imposed upon them by regulations issued by the War
Department." 5 In so holding, the court expressly stated that the plaintiffs
had no legal claim because of the long delay in bringing the suit."6 The
court stated that the plaintiffs have "an equitable but not a legal claim
against the United States.""' 7 Thus, there may be in equity at least one
more potentially protectable interest held by fishermen in either the right
to fish, or in fisheries resources.
V. RIGHTS BASED FISHERY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
Fishermen have acquired significant proprietary interests in fisheries
resources through their participation in rights based fishery management
programs. These programs are founded upon an economic theory that
seeks to increase the incentives for fishermen to conserve common
fisheries resources by granting to those fishermen a private property
interest in the fishery. Many variants of these programs have developed,
including territorial use rights, limited entry fishing permits, and individ-
ual catch quotas. Additionally, interests created within these programs are
often transferable. In the United States, rights based fishery management
systems have been implemented primarily on a federal level, and though
there has been a temporary moratorium imposed on any new individual
quota management plans, it has been widely recognized that these forms
of management systems convey substantial proprietary interests to
participant fishermen. The development of these rights based manage-
114. Blake v. United States, 181 F. Supp. at 587.
115. Todd v. United States, 155 Ct. CI. 111 (1961).
116. Id.
117. Id.
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ment systems, and the proprietary interests that they create, provides
additional evidence of the extent to which fishermen have acquired private
property interests in fisheries resources.
A. A Brief Survey of Rights Based Fishery Management Systems
Most discussion concerning the privatization of fisheries resources has
occurred within the context of rights based fishery management
systems.118  These systems are perhaps the most openly acknowledged
examples of the privatization of fishermen's interests in fisheries re-
sources. 119 Such systems attempt to remedy the inherent flaws of open
access fishery management systems'20 by creating certain forms of private
property interests in a given fishery.
The need for such private property interests arises from the perceived
failure of open access fishery management systems,' under which
fisheries resources around the world have been tragically exploited and
overfished," so much so that many fisheries are now threatened with
imminent collapse." It has been argued by many commentators that the
118. A large amount of commentary and legal analysis has developed in relation to
rights based fishery management systems. For a complete analysis of these systems, see
generally LIMNED ENTRY AS A FISHERIES MANAGEMENT TOOL (R. Bruce Rettig & Jay J. C.
Ginter eds., 1978); Robert B. Groseclose & Gregory K. Boone, An Examination of Limited
Entry as4 Method of 41locating Commercial Fishing Rights, 6 U.C.L.A.-ALAsKA L. REv.
201 (1977); Franz Thomas Litz, Comment, Harnessing Market Forces in Natural Resource
Management: Lessons from the Surf Clam Industry, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 335
(1994); William J. Milliken, Individual Transferable Quotas andAntitrust Law, I OCEAN
& COASTAL L.J. 35 (1994); Pearse, supra note 17; Scott, supra note 6; Carrie A. Tipton,
Protecting Tomorrow's Harvest: Developing a National System of Individual Transferable
Quotas to Conserve Ocean Resources, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 381 (1995); Jon D. Weiss, Note,
A Taxing Issue: Are Limited Entry Fishing Permits Property?, 9 ALASKA L. REv. 93 (1992).
119. See Scott, supra note 6, at 33 (arguing that the emergence of rights based fishery
management systems is part of an overall transition to systems based on private rights).
120. See Michael K. Orbach, Social and Cultural Aspects ofLimited Entry, in LIMrrED
ENTRY AS A FISHERY MANAGEMENT TOOL 211,214-15 (R. Bruce Rettig & Jay J. C. Ginter
eds., 1978).
121. See Pearse, supra note 17, at 71.
122. See Tipton, supra note 118, at 382-83.
123. Betsy Carpenter & Lisa Busch, Not Enough Fish in the Stormy Sea, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Aug. 15, 1994, at 55 (noting that off of New England shores, stocks of
haddock, cod, flounder, and other groundfish have been reduced by a stunning 65 percent
between 1977 and 1987).
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inherent tragedy" of this global crisis is an inevitable"z consequence of
the nature of open access property systems.126 In an effort to combat this
crisis, rights based fishery management systems have been developed
which essentially grant fishermen a certain measure of private property
interests in a given fishery.27 The economic theory behind such systems
dictates that by granting a private property interest in the fishery, an
individual fisherman will be forced to internalize the "externalities,"'12
or costs, which would otherwise be shared by all in the exploitation of a
common property system.
B. Forms of Rights Based Fishery Management Systems
There are several different forms of rights based fishery management
mechanisms. These mechanisms include territorial use rights, limited
entry licensing systems, and individual catch quotas. 129 Territorial use
124. The quintessential article on the "tragedy of the commons" was written by Garret
Hardin in 1968; see Hardin, supra note 2, at 1243. A defining passage from Hardin's
allegory states that where a hypothetical herdsman has open access to a common property
resource, such as a commons used for grazing of cattle, the rational herdsman will seek to
maximize his gain and thus "concludes that the only sensible course for him to pursue is to
add another animal to the herd. And another, and another.... But this is the conclusion
reached by each and every rational herdsman sharing a commons. Therein is the tragedy."
Id. at 1244.
125. One commentator has explained the regulatory and economic implications of this
exigency as follows:
If there is no control over access in fisheries and if demand for a stock (or stocks) of
a fish is increasing, then:
1. Overcapitalization is inevitable and will become worse as prices for the product
increase.
2. Measures to prevent depletion will either impose or lead to increased costs of
fishing to the fishermen, and these costs will become greater as prices for the product
increase.
3. The costs of management, research, and enforcement will be borne entirely by the
taxpayer.
Francis T. Christy, Jr., The Costs of Uncontrolled Access in Fisheries, in LIMITED ENTRY
AS A FISHERY MANAGEMENT TOOL 201, 201 (R. Bruce Rettig & Jay J. C. Ginter eds., 1978).
126. See, e.g., Milliken, supra note 118, at 37.
127. See Scott, supra note 6, at 26-27.
128. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, in THE ECONOMICS OF
LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS: READINGS IN THE THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 23, 31 (Henry G.
Manne ed., 1975) ("The resulting private ownership... will internalize many of the external
costs associated with communal ownership.").
129. Scott, supra note 6, at 22. The discussion within this section is limited to those
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rights (TURFs) are exclusive use rights that generally arise in limited
circumstances where conditions permit the acquisition and defense of
private property rights.13° TURFs have existed for centuries, and have
traditionally been applied to situations such as oyster and mussel beds,
seaweed beds, raft cultures, artificial reef structures, fixed net fishing, and
bottom fish, octopus, or lobster trapping.' These systems are very
flexible in terms of what exclusive use rights may be conveyed to the
participant fishermen and what form of tenure is involved, but they most
always will involve a transfer of exclusive property rights in the fishery. 1
Although TURFs have not been widely adopted in the United States, they
represent a method of fishery privatization which can most closely
resemble a private property system. The historical existence, and
persistence of this method of rights based fishing provides concrete
evidence of the existence of special or private property rights held by
fishermen in marine resources.
A second form of rights based fishery management mechanism is the
limited entry license system, by which the optimum participation of
fishermen in a fishery is maintained by limiting the actual number of
licenses granted for that particular fishery.' Limited license systems
have the ability to elevate the property interests of the participant fisher-
man by allocating at least some small degree of exclusive use rights, and
by allowing the transferability of those rights where the system permits
such transfer. 34
A third type of rights based mechanism, and perhaps the most
common and most widely discussed form of rights based mechanism, is
the use of individual catch quotas.'35 These systems utilize a market-based
rights based management systems that give the participant fisherman at least some degree
of exclusivity; for a discussion of other "limited entry" systems that limit participation by
economic disincentive, such as taxation, license fees, and royalties, see Groseclose & Boone,
supra note 118, at 205-208.
130. FRANcIs T. CHRISTY, JR., FOOD AND AGRICULTuRAL ORGANIZAION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS, TERRITORIAL USE RIGHTS IN MARINE FISHERIES: DEFINmONS AND
CONDITONs, FAO FISHERIES TECHNICAL PAPERNo. 227, at 1 (1982).
131. Id
132. Id at 3-5.
133. Groseclose & Boone, supra note 118, at 207. Limited entry systems can also limit
the number of fishing boats and specified forms of fishing gear. Id
134. Scott, supra note 6, at 23-24.
135. See generally Tipton, supra note 118 (discussing the use of catch quotas in the
United States, and the use of similar systems presently utilized in foreign fishery
management systems).
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rationale in allocating a certain percentage of allowable catch quotas to
participant fishermen prior to the beginning of each new fishing season.136
The rationale behind this form of management system is that the quotas
will give each participant fisherman a private "stake" in the fishery, 37 and
that this stake, coupled with the long term security of obtaining a certain
harvest,138 will give the fisherman an incentive to engage in less wasteful
and less dangerous fishing practices 139 that are normally associated with
other forms of fisheries regulations.
C. Rights Based Systems Under the Magnuson Act
Rights based fishery management systems that limit the access of
fishermen to the fishery resources in the United States are implemented
on a federal level under the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Manage-
ment Act" of 1976. The Magunson Act was adopted in response to
worldwide and domestic declines in fisheries populations.'41 Under the
Act, the United States asserted sovereignty and exclusive rights to fishery
management control over all fisheries resources within the Exclusive
Economic Zone (EEZ), 42 which extends to 200 miles out from the shores
of the United States. 43 The Magnuson Act authorizes the federal govern-
ment to promulgate fisheries regulations in the form of regional fisheries
management plans, administered by Regional Fishery Management
Councils.'" The underlying objective of the Magnuson Act is the
conservation of fisheries resources, 145 the harvest of which is governed
136. Id. at 397-400.
137. Milliken, supra note 118, at 39-40.
138. Id.
139. Tipton, supra note 118, at 397-400.
140. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-1883 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997). See generally Sen. Warren
G. Magnuson, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976: First Step Toward
Improved Management of Marine Fisheries, 52 WASH. L. REv. 427 (1977) (discussing the
historical circumstances underlying the enactment of the Magnuson Act). The Magnuson
Act was remaned in 1996 as the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management
Act by the passage of the Sustainable Fisheries Act, which amended the statute. Pub. L. No.
194-297, 110 Stat. 3559 (1996).
141. Tipton, supra note 118, at 387.
142. Douglas M. Ancona, Managing United States Marine Fisheries, 4 NAT.
RESOURCES & ENv'T, Spring 1990, at 23.
143. Id.
144. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1852 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997).
145. Id. § 1851(a)(1).
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under the Act by an "optimum yield" objective." Specifically, in the
context of limited entry fishery management systems, the Magnuson Act
currently provides that a fishery management plan may "establish a limited
access system for the fishery in order to achieve optimum yield."147
However, numerous factors must first be considered by the Council and
the Secretary of Commerce before the plan may be adopted.' These
factors include social, historical, and cultural considerations in addition to
the economic circumstances of the fishery. 149
D. Proprietary Interests in 1TQs
By possessing an ITQ, a fisherman obtains a right to an allocated
amount of a fishery harvest, and with this right the fisherman acquires
several important characteristics of private property,50 despite the
consistent statements from government agencies and commentators that
ITQs are merely privileges, and not rights.'5' Among these property
characteristics are: (1) economic value, (2) exclusivity, (3) duration, (4)
divisibility, (5) inhabitability, and (6) transferability. 2
The economic value of an ITQ can be quite significant. For example,
most ITQ permits maintain an estimated value in excess of $100,000, and
some are valued at more than $500,000.15 Thus, ITQs do in fact have
146. National Standard #1 states that: "Conservation and management measures shall
prevent overfishing while achieving, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from each
fishery for the United States fishing industry." Id
147. Id § 1853(b)(6). While § 1853(b)(6) provides authorization for limited entry
systems under the Magnuson Act, Congress enacted in October of 1996 a moritorium on the
implementation and approval of any fishery management plan that creates a new individual
quota program. Id § 1853(d)(1)(A).
148. Id, § 1853(b)(6)(A)-(F) (1994).
149. Id.
150. Weiss, supra note 118, at 111-12 (concluding that ITQ's are property for the
purposes of taxation).
151. Koch, supra note 25, at 265.
152. See Scott, supra note 6, at 14, 21-24.
153. Weiss, supra note 118, at 106. Weiss notes examples of where courts have found
ITQs to be of some significant monetary value. Id at 106 n.100. See, e.g., Bronsan v.
Bronsan, 817 P.2d 478,479 (Alaska 1991) (limited entry permit worth $240,000 at time of
divorce); Anderson v. Anderson, 736 P.2d 320, 324 (Alaska 1987) (limited entry fishing
permit is subject to execution for satisfaction of past due child support funds); Brown v.
Baker, 688 P.2d 943, 948 (Alaska 1984) (permit constitutes a valuable license for the
participation of licensee in fishery); State v. Ostrosky, 667 P.2d 1184, 1191 n.8 (Alaska
1983) (noting average prices of limited entry fishing permits), appeal dismissed, 467 U.S.
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economic value which has been quantified by the free market system
which underlies them.
ITQs also demonstrate characteristics of exclusivity. 54 To the extent
that some other non-participant fisherman can not harvest from an ITQ
fishery, the owner of the ITQ has an exclusive interest in the use of the
fishery that is superior to that of the non-participant fisherman.
There is also some measure of durational interests associated with the
fishing rights acquired under a ITQ fishery management system. 55
Although ITQ interests normally are allocated for one year or less, the
existence of such durational characteristics gives the ITQ holder a
valuable right, in that it allows the holder to utilize the quota at any rate
of consumption, thereby allowing for more efficient fishing practices and
a more secure setting. To the extent that a ITQ participant fisherman can
count on his fishing rights to exist at some time in the future, an ITQ
conveys valuable durational rights from the standpoint of expectancy
interests.
Divisibility is another important property rights characteristic con-
veyed by an ITQ permit,'56 whereby an ITQ may be portioned off or
leased' 57 to another fisherman. In a situation where the fisherman may
lease the ITQ interest, the fisherman is dividing and conveying possessory
interests to the lessee, who obtains all pertinent use rights without actually
owning the ITQ. In this situation, the interest is divided, and demon-
strates how the ITQ property interest may be divided into segments. An
additional proprietary characteristic which may be exhibited in ITQ
management systems is that of inheritability5 ' As in Alaskan ITQ
systems, the ITQ may be inherited by the offspring of a ITQ holder.5 9
One last proprietary characteristic of ITQ interests is transferability,'6
which actually encompasses the characteristic of inheritability. Transfer-
ability, of course, is a defining characteristic of ITQs. If a fisherman
desires to leave the ITQ fishery, or if the fisherman is forced to exit the
1201 (1984).
154. See Scott, supra note 6, at 26-27.
155. Id. at 27.
156. Id. at 13-14.
157. Groseclose & Boone, supra note 118, at 206; Katherine A. Marvin, Note,
Protecting Common Property Resources Through the Marketplace: Individual Transferable
Quotas for Surf Clams and Ocean Quahogs, 16 VT. L. REV. 1127, 1151-52 (1992).
158. Orbach, supra note 120, at 220.
159. Id.
160. Scott, supra note 6, at 14.
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system due to inefficient, non-competitive fishing practices, then that
fisherman's ITQ interest may be sold to another fisherman who is more
efficient.' The natural consequence of such transferability, as some
commentators argue, is the consolidation of ITQ interests in those
fishermen, or other entities, who have the most capital.1 62 Whether this
consequence is desirable or not, an ITQ fishery can resemble a stock
market under the proper conditions, where quotas are bought and sold on
an open market in which interests gain or lose value in accordance with
the overall health of the ITQ fishery. 163 To this extent, holders of ITQ
interests acquire a valuable transferable interest which gives them an
incentive to safeguard the fishery in which they hold their ITQ proprietary
interest.
Despite the many characteristics of property that ITQs possess, it
remains apparent that the rights afforded to ITQ holders exist only as a
result of permissive governmental legislation, which may in the future be
revoked like any other "privilege.""6 However, even though privileges
are not equivalent to vested private property rights in a legal sense, the
publicized perceptions of ITQs seem to indicate that many people believe
161. Anthony D. Scott, The 1TQ as a Property Right: Where it Came From, How it
Works, and Where its Going, in ATLANTIC INST. FOR MKT. STUDIES, TAKING OWNERSHIP
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FISHERY MANAGEMENT ON THE ATLANTIC COAST, 31,51 (Brian Lee
Crowley ed., 1996)
162. See, e.g., Anthony Davis, To Transfer or Not to Transfer, ATLANTIC FISHERMAN,
May 1993, at 5.
Through time this process ensures that quota becomes concentrated in the possession
of fewer and fewer vessel owners. It also assures that through time fewer coastal
communities contain vessels with quota supplying resource to local plants. In short,
quota and fishing activity become increasingly concentrated in fewer and fewer
enterprises and fishing towns.
Id
163. Tipton, supra note 118, at 412.
164. Scott, supra note 6, at 27. However, property rights have always been recognized
to be constructs of a legal framework of laws. As the Supreme Court has recently stated in
the context of takings, the courts must look into "existing rules or understandings that stem
from an independent source such as state law [in order] to define the range of interests that
qualify for protection as private 'property' under the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments."
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992). Indeed, in a more
theoretical context, as Jeremy Bentham once wrote: "Property and law are born together and
must die together. Before the laws there was no property: take away the laws, all property
ceases." Jeremy Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY
BENTHAM (John Browning ed., 1843), quoted in RICHARD SCHLATrER, PRIVATE PROPERTY
239(1951).
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that an ITQ is in fact a "private property right."'" Indeed, one of the most
popular arguments against ITQs is that they represent a great "give away"
of treasured public resources to private parties." In any event, rights
based fishery management systems like ITQs do to some extent "privatize"
U.S. fisheries resources.167 As described above, they have the potential
to increase the degree of private property characteristics held by fisher-
men in fisheries resources. As such, these management systems are yet
further evidence and support of the plausibility and recognition of private
property interests in fisheries under the law, at least in some measure.
Indeed, as the next section demonstrates, the common law already
provides the framework to recognize such rights in a way that is compati-
ble with the long term concerns of those who fear the permanent loss of
public resources to private individuals.
VI. PRIVATE FISHERY INTERESTS UNDER
THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
Under the public trust doctrine, submerged and submersible lands are
held by the state in trust for the public, and as trustee the state has a
sovereign responsibility to preserve and protect the right of the public to
use these waters and lands for fishing, fouling, navigation, and in some
circumstances, recreation. Within the framework of this doctrine, public
and private interests may coexist in public trust resources, and state and
165. See Betsy Carpenter & Lisa Busch, supra note 123, at 55 ("experts are advocating
a system that in essence privatizes the nation's fisheries"); Mark Trumbull, Fisheries Crisis
Stretches Across the Globe, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, July 6, 1994, at 8 ("turning fish
resources into private property"); Donald R. Leal, Using Property Rights to Regulate Fish
Harvest, CHRISTIAN SCl. MONITOR, July 30, 1992, at 18 ("each fisherman has a property
right in a fixed proportion of the total allowable catch"); Tim Bradner, Halibut Quotas
Would Bring Order, But Could Freeze Alaskans Out, ALA. J. COM., Jan. 6, 1992, sect. I, at
1 (individual quota allocations "establish a private property right to a public good"); Clement
V. Tillon, Remarks as Panelist for National Conference to Consider Limited Entry as a Tool
in Fishery Management (July 17, 1978), in LIMITED ENTRY AS A FISHERY MANAGEMENT
TOOL 38, 39 (R. Bruce Rettig & Jay J. C. Ginter eds., 1978) ("[I]imited entry gives us a
property right in the resources").
166. Tipton, supra note 118, at 405; see also Carpenter & Busch, supra note 123
("critics contend ... it constitutes a 'grand giveaway' of public resources to private
industry"); Greenpeace Clarifies Anti-ITQ Reasoning, COMM. FISHERIES NEWS, Mar. 1996,
at 7A (criticizing "management plans that call for selling off our common natural
resources").
167. Pearse, supra note 17, at 82.
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federal governments have the obligation to protect and preserve natural
resources such as fisheries. Although the precepts of the public trust
doctrine impose inherent limitations on the ability of the sovereign to
permanently alienate these resources, the sovereign may do so when the
conveyance serves a legitimate public interest. The principles of the
public trust doctrine are applicable to the context of privatizing use rights
in common fisheries resources, which in itself may serve a legitimate
public interest as a means of conservation, and these principles provide
for the long-term preservation of public interests in fisheries resources in
a manner consistent with U.S. fisheries management objectives. If federal
quota-based management plans are to be pursued in the future, the
protective principles of the public trust doctrine may provide a framework
for recognizing private property interests in fisheries resources, which
could be recognized in the form of a long-term lease interest in catch
quotas that could be allocated to community or regional groups in a
cooperative management system.
A. A Brief Survey of the Public Trust Doctrine
Looming behind all the foregoing discussion of public and private
rights in fisheries resources is the public trust doctrine, which in the
United States has served as the foundation and framework of modem legal
conceptions concerning the ownership of common resources such as
fisheries. The public trust doctrine is an ancient, and relatively obscure
common law doctrine16 which is derived form the English common law,
under which the King held in trust for the nation all lands which were
subject to the ebb and flow of the tide.169 When the United States achiev-
ed independence from the Crown, these lands and waters became vested
in the states of the union. 70 As the Supreme Court stated in Shively v.
Bowlby,17' "[a]t common law, the tide and dominion in lands flowed by
168. For a complete analysis of the history and legal parameters of the public trust
doctrine, see generally Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 471 (1970); Jan S. Stevens, The Public
Trust: A Sovereign's Ancient Prerogative Becomes The People's Environmental Right, 14
U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 195 (1980); Alison Rieser, Public Trust, Public Use, and Just
Compensation, 42 ME. L. REV. 5 (1990); Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A
Sometimes Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 Yale L.J. 762 (1970).
169. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1893).
170. Id,
171. Id. at 1.
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the tide water were in the King for the benefit of the nation .... Upon
the American revolution, these rights, charged with a like trust, were
vested in the original States" and also in those states that subsequently
entered the union."' In the early but influential case of Arnold v.Mundy,'73 the New Jersey Supreme Court found that:
[T]he navigable rivers in which the tide ebbs and flows, the ports,
the bays, the coasts of the sea, including both the water and the
land under the water, for the purpose of passing and repassing,
navigation, fishing, fowling, sustenance, and all the other uses of
the water and its products (a few things excepted) are common to
all the citizens, and that each has a right to use them according to
his necessities, subject only to the laws which regulate that use;
that the property, indeed, strictly speaking, is vested in the
sovereign, but it is vested in him not for his own use, but for the
use of the citizen, that is, for his direct and immediate
enjoyment.174
As the court in Mundy explained in 1821, the public trust doctrine has
historically protected the public rights of fishing, fowling, and navigation
in public trust lands and waters. 75 However, the doctrine has been
expanded by several courts in recent history to include the protection of
other public uses such as that of recreational activities. 7 6 In this sense,
the public trust doctrine, though limited in geographical scope to lands
which are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, 77 has developed under
172. See Philips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988). Under the "equal
footing" doctrine, each state received an equal ownership interest in public trust lands upon
entry into the union. Id at 472.
173. 6N.J.L. 1 (1821).
174. Id. at 76-77.
175. Id. See also Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168, 170-71 (Me. 1989) (noting
traditionally protected public uses of fishing, fowling, and navigation under Massachusetts
and Maine common law history).
176. See Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 363-64 (1984)
(holding that New Jersey public had public trust right to recreation in public trust, or
intertidal lands, and that this public right carries with it rights of use that allow for the access
and reasonable incidental usage of upland sand areas).
177. Phillips Petroleum Co., v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. at 479-80. In Phillips Petroleum,
the Court found that prior decisions in admiralty "extended admiralty jurisdiction and public
trust doctrine to navigable freshwaters and the lands beneath them," but that the Court did
not interpret those decisions "as simultaneously withdrawing from public trust coverage
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the common law to be a "dynamic" doctrine7 . that evolves with the
demands of society to protect the public uses of trust lands and waters in
a flexible manner that reflects the different uses of such lands that occur
over the span of time.
In addition to protecting public use rights, the public trust doctrine has
also been interpreted to impose a sovereign duty of environmental
stewardship for the benefit of the public.'79 As one court has stated:
"Under the public trust doctrine, the State... and the United States have
the right and the duty to protect and preserve the public's interest in
natural wildlife resources. Such right does not derive from the ownership
of the resources but from a duty owing to the people.""s The develop-
ment of these "stewardship" duties is mostly a product of modem interpre-
tations of the doctrine,"'1 and although the exact affirmative scope of these
duties remains ambiguous, such duties clearly apply to the state and
federal government in the preservation of living marine resources."
What is certain about the public trust doctrine is that it has tradition-
ally protected the public right to fish in public trust lands and waters.
Thus, as discussed above, the doctrine preserves the historical common
those lands which had been consistently recognized in this Court's cases as being within that
doctrines scope: all lands beneath waters influenced by the ebb and flow of the tide." Id
(emphasis in original). In so holding, the Court rejected the idea that the scope of the public
trust doctrine, which applied to "navigable waters," was defined by the "navigability in fact"
definition of "navigable waters" as found in admiralty under The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10
Wall.) 557 (1870).
178. See, e.g., Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d at 363-64
(expanding public trust doctrine to protect recreational activities on intertidal lands and
incidental usage of upland dry sand areas); Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597 (Me.
1981) (supporting flexibility of doctrine to accommodate contemporary needs of the public).
179. See Macinko, supra note 6, at 951-52.
180. In re Complaint of Stuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38,40 (E.D. Vir. 1980) (citing
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 408 (1948) (upholding state's right "to conserve or utilize
its resources on behalf of its own citizens")). See also Illinois Cent. 1R. Co. v. Illinois, 146
U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (recognizing "that trust which requires the government of the State to
preserve such waters for the use of the public"); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal.
1971) (noting that "[t]here is a growing public recognition" that preservation is one of the
most important uses of public trust resources).
181. For a discussion comparing the traditional principles of the public trust doctrine
with its modem development encompassing stewardship objectives, see Jack H. Archer &
M. Casey Jarman, Sovereign Rights and Responsibilities: Applying Public Trust Principles
to the Management ofEEZSpace and Resources, 17 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 253,255-
258(1992).
182. See In re Complaint of Stuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. at 40.
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law public right to fish. 8 3 The doctrine is therefore intimately involved
with any questions concerning public or private interests in fisheries
resources. As discussed below, the proprietary theories which underlie
the public trust doctrine provide useful insights into the possibility of
private property interests existing in U.S. fisheries.
B. Public and Private Interests Under the Public Trust Doctrine
The public trust doctrine dictates that the sovereign state holds the
subject lands in trust for the benefit of the public. However, the state's
interest is not the only property interest which may exist under the public
trust doctrine. In fact, conveyances of private interests in public trust
lands have been approved by courts,"s under the theory that there is an
inherent dichotomy in public and private property interests that may
simultaneously exist in public trust lands. This dichotomy has long been
supported in American case law," 5 under which the public interest is
deemed to be the jus publicum and the private interest is deemed to be the
jus privatum."6
The Supreme Court has explained this dichotomy of public and private
interests by stating that: "As has been seen, by the law of England, the
title in fee, or jus privatum, of the King or his grantee was, in the phrase
of Lord Hale, 'charged with and subject to that jus publicum which
belongs to the King's subjects,"' and that thejusprivatum is "'clothed and
superinduced with a jus publicum, wherein both natives and foreigners
. . . are interested by reason of common commerce, trade, and inter-
course.""8 7 Therefore, under the public trust doctrine as adopted by the
courts, a private title to public trust lands is taken subject to the public
183. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
184. See, e.g., Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356 (Mass.
1979). The court in Boston Waterfront stated that:
The jus privatum/jus publicum distinction in regard to the shoreland property was
carried over to the new world, so that the company's ownership was understood to
consist of ajus privatum which could be "parceled out to corporations and individuals
... as private property" and ajus publicum "in trust for public use of all those who
should become inhabitants of said territory ......
Id. at 359 (quoting Commonwealth v. Roxbury, 9 Gray 451, 483-484 (1857)).
185. As early as 1893, the United States Supreme Court recognized thejusprivatum and
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trust uses, such as fishing, fowling, and navigation, which are protected
under the public trust doctrine."' 8
C. Limitations on Alienation Under the Public Trust Doctrine
Any potential recognition of fishermen's private interests in common
fisheries raises the issue of whether the alienation of such property, or use
rights, may be "consistent with the exercise of that trust which requires the
government of the state to preserve" such public trust property for the
benefit of present and future generations of the public.189
In Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, the Supreme Court addressed
the question of the alienation of public trust property by the state to
private individuals. In that case, an 1869 Illinois statute conveyed, or
purported to convey, a large portion of submerged lands within Chicago
Harbor to a private party, Illinois Central Railroad Co."9 Subsequently,
the Legislature received overwhelming disapproval from the public, and
in 1873 enacted another statute that repealed the former statute that
originally conveyed the land. The state soon thereafter brought suit to
quiet title to the submerged lands, and upon reaching the Supreme Court
it was held, in an opinion by Justice Field, that the original conveyance
was revocable due to the overriding public interests in the submerged
lands which were held in trust for the public. The Court explained its
holding by stating that:
The control of the State for the purposes of the public trust can
never be lost, except as to such parcels as are used in promoting
the interest of the public therein, or can be disposed of without
any substantial impairment of the public interest in the lands and
waters remaining.191
Therefore, public trust property may be conveyed in the form of ajus
privatum, but such conveyance cannot grant absolute ownership unless it
is in the public interest to do so. The Court in Illinois Central Railroad
further explained that:
188. IM. at 49-50.
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The State can no more abdicate its trust over property in which
the whole people are interested, like navigable waters and the
soils under them, so as to leave them entirely under the use and
control of private parties . . . than it can abdicate its police
powers in the administration of government,192
except in those circumstances which entail the improvement of navigation
or where the parcel may "be disposed of without impairment of the public
interest in what remains.'0
93
Therefore, there is an inherent limitation on the alienability of public
trust lands, but such conveyances of private interests may be granted in
situations where the conveyance is not in conflict with the public interest
in those lands and serves a legitimate public purpose. 194 Additionally,
such conveyances are revocable if in the future the purpose for which the
conveyance was made becomes inconsistent with the contemporary public
interest."19 In an ironic twist of reasoning, it has been found in limited
circumstances that the conveyance of such private property interests can
in itself be a legitimate public purpose. 196
This rationale may be consistently applied to the recognition of private
property interests in the use of fisheries resources. Accordingly, any
possible recognition of such rights may be construed as actually promoting
a critical public interest, in that the creation of these rights may be the
only way to actually preserve the public's interest in conserving fisheries
192. Id.
193. Id. See also People v. Chicago Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773 (Il1. 1976) (conveyance
of submerged lands by legislature held to be void under Illinois Cent. R.R Co. v. Illinois);
Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 997 (Wash. 1987) (state statute permitting certain owners
of residential property abutting tidelands to install and maintain private recreational docks
did not impair public interests in lands so as to amount to a violation of the public trust
doctrine under Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois).
194. See People v. Chicago Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d at 781 ("self-serving recitation of a
public purpose" is not conclusive) (quoting People v. McMackin, 291 N.E.2d 807, 812 (I11.
1972)).
195. Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356 (Mass. 1979)
(finding that conveyance to corporation was revocable and that conveyance was in the
nature of a fee simple subject to the condition subsequent that it be used for the public
purpose for which it was granted).
196. Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597 (Me. 1981) (finding that statutory
conveyance of all submerged lands that were filled prior to October 1, 1975, was actually
in furtherance of public interest by eliminating possibility of costly and time-consuming
efforts to determine actual ownership of such lands as belonging to the state or a private
party).
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resources."9 In this light, a recognition of private property interests held
by fishermen in fisheries resources may be deemed consistent with the
public trust doctrine. Such an interest could be recognized as a leasehold
interest in a fishing quota, for example, owned either by individual
fishermen or by collective community-based entities that independently
allocate quota interests.
D. A Possible Application of Public Trust Precepts
to Rights-Based Fishing
Community-based fishery management strategies have recently
received increasing attention as a viable alternative approach to modem,
centralized fisheries management systems.' Generally, community-based
fishery management systems seek to harness the forces of custom and
culture to constrain the tragedy of the commons by allowing fishermen to
participate in the governmental regulation of fisheries.199 In view of the
precepts of the public trust doctrine discussed above, there are several
reasons why community-based management systems would be an effective
mechanism for the allocation of private interests in fisheries resources in
a manner consistent with public trust stewardship principles. First,
community-based systems reflect the social cohesion and local conditions
of a fishing community, as well as the specialized knowledge of local
fishermen.' Second, fishermen assign greater legitimacy to rules
established by such systems, as opposed to government-imposed regula-
tions." Third, the participant managers of such systems have greater
incentive to maximize the benefits derived from the management
197. See Scott, supra note 161, at 34 (proposing property rights in fisheries as an
alternative to other forms of regulation in order to motivate fishers to restrain their
individual harvest).
198. See Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons (1990), in AN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
ANTHoLoGY 286, 290-92 (Robert L. Fischman et al. eds., 1996); Bonnie J. McCay, Social
and Ecological Implications oflTQs: An Overview, 28 OCEAN & COASTAL MGMT. 3, 16
(1995).
199. See Donald R. Leal, Community-Run Fisheries; Preventing the Tragedy of the
Commons, in ATLANnc INST. FOR MKT. STUDIES, TAKING OWNERSHIP: PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND FISHERY MANAGEMENT ONTHE ATLANTIC COAST 183, 185 (Brian Lee Crowley ed.,
1996).
200. lad at 184.
201. ld
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system.' In sum, these systems guarantee the long-term involvement of
communities, and assign them a significant financial stake in the system,
in a manner that may efficiently promote the preservation of the regulated
fishery, 3 while maintaining the ability of the government to ultimately
control overall catch levels.
The allocation of private lease interests within such a community-
based system would, to a large extent, dispel the criticism that rights-
based fishery management systems result in a "give away" of common
fishery resources,' because it would be founded upon the long-term
interests of entire communities, as well as the precepts of the public trust
doctrine. The interest could have a greater duration than typical quotas,
allowing long-term interests in a given percentage of the fishery resource.
Such interests could more effectively promote a public purpose of
conservation by providing a more reliable and stable form of private
property interest, with greater exclusivity, duration, and transferability
characteristics. 205 Additionally, if in the future the conveyance no longer
served the interest of the public, it would typically be revocable by the
granting authority under the precepts of the public trust doctrine. 6 The
creation of such a lease-interest may be a step in the right direction if
rights-based management systems are pursued in the future. Rights-based
fishery management systems have successfully demonstrated the capacity
of privatization to remedy over-capitalization and over-fishing in a number
of fisheries.2 7 With this in mind, the protections of the public trust
doctrine should assist in discouraging the future abandonment of such
systems under U.S. fishery management programs.
VII. CONCLUSION
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that fishermen's private property
interests in fisheries are routinely recognized under the law in the United
202. Id.
203. See Teresa M. Cloutier, Comment, Conflicts of Interest on Regional Fisheries
Management Councils: Corruption or Cooperative Management?, 2 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J.
101, 109-11 (1996) (discussing efficiencies of cooperative management systems).
204. See McCay, supra note 198, at 13-14.
205. For a discussion of the importance of these proprietary interests in rights based
fishery management systems, see Scott, supra note 161, at 37-42.
206. See supra notes 189-96 and accompanying text.
207. Leal, supra note 199, at 183-84.
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States, though they may not always be in the nature of "vested" interests.
Nevertheless, these interests do exist, and cumulatively they evidence a
special proprietary relationship between fishermen and fisheries resources.
This relationship may be pursued and acknowledged under the framework
of the public trust doctrine, possibly as a long-term leasehold interest in
a community-based management context. If the United States decides to
pursue limited-entry or rights-based fishery management regimes in the
future, then this proprietary interest may be beneficially utilized in the
furtherance of fisheries management and conservation efforts. Addition-
ally, the principles of the public trust doctrine should protect the underly-
ing interests of the public in these treasured common resources. These
same principles should also dispel the criticism that the pursuit of rights-
based fishing regimes would result in a "give away" of public resources.
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